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PARTY SYSTEM INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND PARTY SYSTEM THEORY AFTER THE THIRD WAVE OF DEMOCRATIZATION[*]

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The main argument of this chapter is that the level of institutionalization is a critical dimension for understanding party systems. Until the mid-1990s, the literature on parties and party systems neglected this fact, as most work on these subjects implicitly assumed a high level of institutionalization of the party system. Yet without focusing on institutionalization, it is impossible to account for important characteristics of party systems in most post-1978 democracies and semi-democracies. Voters, parties, and party systems in most post-1978 competitive regimes are qualitatively different from those of the advanced industrial democracies.

We focus on the first two dimensions of party system institutionalization that Mainwaring and Scully (1995) and Mainwaring (1999: 22–39) developed: the stability of interparty competition and the depth of party roots (or anchoring) in society. In these two dimensions, there are persistent and large differences in institutionalization between most post-1978 democracies and semi-democracies and the advanced industrial democracies. Most of the advanced industrial democracies exhibit far greater stability in interparty competition than most post-1978 democracies.

In addition, party roots in society are far stronger in most of the advanced industrial democracies than in most post-1978 democracies and semi-democracies. Much of the literature assumes strong party roots in society. In fact, party roots in society range from strong in most of the advanced industrial to weak in most post-1978 competitive regimes. We analyze two empirical manifestations of the variable strength of party roots in society. First, considerable theoretical and comparative literature presupposes that programmatic or ideological linkages are at the root of stable linkages between voters and parties. In these theories, voters choose a party or candidate on the basis of their ideological or programmatic preferences. In most post-1978 democracies and semi-democracies, however, programmatic or ideological linkages between voters and parties are weak. Weak programmatic and ideological linkages between voters and parties are a key part of weaker party roots in society.

The other empirical manifestation of weak party roots in society that we address is that linkages between voters and candidates are more personalistic in most post-1978 competitive regimes than in the advanced industrial democracies. Outside the advanced democracies, more voters choose candidates on the basis of their personal characteristics without regard to party, ideology, or programmatic issues. The high degree of personalism reflects weak party roots in society and runs counter to what one would expect on the basis of most of the theoretical literature on voters and party systems. Personalism taps an important criterion for assessing the institutionalization of political parties: the depersonalization of parties and party competition (Mény, 1990: 67).

In the conclusion, we argue that weak institutionalization has negative consequences for electoral accountability. Weakly institutionalized

party systems are more vulnerable to allowing anti-party politicians to come to power. Many such anti-party politicians (e.g., President Alberto Fujimori in Peru, 1990–2000; President Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, 1998–present) have had adverse effects on democracy. We also argue that weak institutionalization hampers electoral accountability, which is a key underpinning of democracy.

Until the 1980s, the theoretical literature on parties and party systems focused on or implicitly assumed well-institutionalized systems. There were few democracies and semi-democracies with weakly institutionalized party systems. Since the beginning of the third wave of democratization (Huntington, 1991), however, weakly institutionalized party systems have become commonplace in competitive political regimes. These systems have different characteristics and dynamics than well-institutionalized systems. Social scientists need to modify the dominant theoretical literature to understand these less institutionalized party systems.

This chapter builds on Mainwaring and Scully (1995) and Mainwaring (1999: 22–39), which spawned most of the contemporary work on party system institutionalization. We add to these earlier works in four ways. First, we provide more systematic empirical evidence by using cross-national surveys to demonstrate some of the earlier propositions about party system institutionalization. Based on survey data, we also develop new indicators to assess the strength of parties' programmatic roots in society. Second, we analyze a broader range of countries than these earlier works and other previous work on this subject. Third, we analyze some new aspects of party system theory that these previous works did not address in detail; in particular, we question the assumption of programmatic/ideological linkages that permeates some of the literature. Finally, we present more rigorous tests of some empirical propositions while dropping some earlier and harder-to-test claims about consequences of low institutionalization. The second half of the chapter, while building conceptually and theoretically on Mainwaring and Scully (1995) and Mainwaring (1999), presents new arguments and evidence.

Unlike Mainwaring and Scully, we do not compare party systems on all four dimensions of party system institutionalization. Given spatial constraints and because of the difficulties of obtaining comparable valid empirical information for all four dimensions for a wide range of countries, we preferred to develop some points in greater depth and for a wider range of countries rather than provide a superficial discussion of all four dimensions. Our analysis is limited exclusively to democracies and semi-democracies;[1] parties that function in authoritarian regimes fall outside our purview.

COMPARING PARTY SYSTEMS: THE LEVEL OF INSTITUTIONALIZATION

A party system is the set of parties that interact in patterned ways. This definition implies three boundaries between systems and non-systems. First, as Sartori (1976) pointed out, a system must have at least two constituent elements; therefore a party system must have at least two parties. Second, the notion of patterned interactions suggests that there are some regularities in the distribution of electoral support by parties over time even if some parties rise and others decline. Third, the idea of a system implies some continuity in the components that form the system. Therefore, 'party system' implies some continuity in the parties that form the system – that is, the institutionalization of political parties.

Party systems vary on many dimensions, but social scientists strive to identify the most important among them to facilitate categorization and comparison. How, then, should social scientists compare and classify party systems? Sartori's (1976) seminal book identified two dimensions of party systems as particularly important: the number of relevant parties and the degree of ideological polarization. However, he inadequately conceptualized an equally important property of party systems: their level of institutionalization.

In his discussion of the difference between consolidated party systems and non-systems, Sartori (1976: 244–8) was prescient in recognizing the importance of party system institutionalization (which he called 'consolidation'). However, we disagree with three aspects of his conceptualization of institutionalization. First, he posited a dichotomy between consolidated systems and non-systems, whereas we find it much more useful to conceive of institutionalization as a continuum. Nothing in the definition of 'system' justifies a rigid dichotomous demarcation between a system and a non-system provided that there is some pattern in interparty competition and some continuity in the main parties of the system. These two criteria are easy to meet in a minimal way. Sartori's dichotomous categories ignore important variance within

each of those categories. Moreover, a dichotomy requires a precise and inevitably arbitrary cut point: a case must be categorized as consolidated or as a non-system.

Second, Sartori set an excessively high threshold for what constitutes a party system. For example, he claimed that Colombia did not have a party system in the 1970s when in fact it had one of the oldest party systems in the world. The Liberals and Conservatives had been the main electoral contenders for decades whenever elections were relatively free and fair, and both parties had strong roots in society.

Third, because he treated non-systems as falling outside the framework of his main theorizing and did not examine variance in institutionalization among party systems or among what he regarded as non-systems, Sartori relegated institutionalization to a secondary position. For example, considerations of institutionalization are entirely absent from his classification of party systems. We believe that the institutionalization of party systems requires center stage. Some of the most important differences among party systems revolve around differences in institutionalization.

A classification of party systems based on the number of parties and the level of polarization overlooks substantial differences in the level of institutionalization, and hence in how party competition functions in less institutionalized contexts. In comparing and classifying party systems beyond the advanced industrial democracies, political scientists who work on Latin America (Bendel, 1993; Coppedge, 1998: 559–61; Kitschelt, 2003; Mainwaring, 1999; Mainwaring and Scully, 1995; Molina and Pérez, 2004; Payne *et al.*, 2002: 127–54; Schedler, 1995; Van Cott, 2000), Africa (Kuenzi and Lambright, 2001), Asia (Johnson, 2002; Stockton, 2001), and the post-communist regions (Bielasiak, 2002; Grzymala-Busse, 2002; Mair, 1997: 175–98; Markowski, 2000; Moser, 1999, 2001; Rose and Munro, 2003; Stoner Weiss, 2001; Tavits, 2005; Tóka, 1997) have increasingly recognized the need to pay attention to the level of institutionalization in addition to Sartori's two dimensions.[2] Institutionalized party systems structure the political process to a high degree. In fluid systems, parties are important actors in some ways, but they do not have the same structuring effect.

Institutionalization refers to a process by which a practice or organization becomes well established and widely known, if not universally accepted. Actors develop expectations, orientations, and behavior based on the premise that this practice or organization will prevail into the foreseeable future. In politics, institutionalization means that political actors have clear and stable expectations about the behavior of other actors. In Huntington's (1968: 12) words, 'Institutionalization is the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability'. An institutionalized party system, then, is one in which actors develop expectations and behavior based on the premise that the fundamental contours and rules of party competition and behavior will prevail into the foreseeable future. In an institutionalized party system, there is stability in who the main parties are and how they behave. The notion of institutionalization should not be teleological, nor is the process linear; there is no necessary progression from weak to greater institutionalization. Party systems can deinstitutionalize, as the Italian, Peruvian, and Venezuelan cases in the 1990s show.

Following Mainwaring (1999: 22–39) and Mainwaring and Scully (1995), we conceptualize four dimensions of party system institutionalization. First, more institutionalized systems manifest considerable stability in patterns of party competition (Przeworski, 1975). This is the easiest dimension of institutionalization to measure, and perhaps the most important because institutionalization is conceptually very closely linked to stability.

Second, in more institutionalized systems, parties have strong roots in society and most voters, conversely, have strong attachments to parties. Most voters identify with a party and vote for it most of the time, and some interest associations are closely linked to parties. Strong party roots in society help provide the regularity in electoral competition that institutionalization entails. Party roots in society and the stability of interparty competition, while analytically separable, are intertwined because strong party roots in society stabilize electoral competition. If most citizens support the same party from one election to the next, there are fewer floating voters, hence less likelihood of massive electoral shifts that are reflected in high volatility. Conversely, where parties have weak roots in society, more voters are likely to shift electoral allegiances from one election to the next, thus bringing about greater potential for high electoral volatility.

Third, in more institutionalized systems, political actors accord legitimacy to parties. They see parties as a necessary part of democratic politics even if they are critical of specific parties and express skepticism about parties in general (Torcal *et al.*, 2002). Legitimacy helps stabilize party systems and hence is a meaningful attitudinal dimension of institutionalization.

Finally, in more institutionalized systems, party organizations are not subordinated to the interests of a few ambitious leaders; they acquire an independent status and value of their own (Huntington, 1968: 12–24).[3] The institutionalization of political parties is limited as long as a party is the personal instrument of a leader or a small coterie (Janda, 1980). When the electorally successful parties are personalistic vehicles, system-level institutionalization is low on this fourth dimension. Solid organizations reflect and reinforce parties' penetration in society.

Although we diverge from Sartori in thinking of institutionalization as a continuum rather than a dichotomy, he deserves great credit for recognizing that there are profound differences in party systems according to the level of institutionalization. After Sartori's classic work, this issue was completely neglected until Bendel (1993) and Mainwaring and Scully (1995).

Party systems characterized by a low degree of institutionalization can be called fluid or weakly institutionalized. Institutionalization is a continuous variable that goes from institutionalized to fluid party systems. Compared to more institutionalized party systems, fluid systems are characterized by less regularity in patterns of party competition; weaker party roots in society; less legitimacy accorded to parties; and weaker party organizations, often dominated by personalistic leaders.

THE STABILITY OF INTERPARTY COMPETITION: ELECTORAL VOLATILITY

To develop the argument that contemporary competitive party systems differ in important ways that cannot be captured by Sartori's typology, we compare 39 countries according to the first dimension of institutionalization: that patterns of party competition manifest regularity. It is the easiest of the four dimensions of institutionalization to measure systematically, specifically by comparing electoral volatility. Electoral volatility refers to the aggregate turnover from one party to others, from one election to the next (Pedersen, 1983; Przeworski, 1975; Roberts and Wibbels, 1999). It is computed by adding the net change in percentage of votes gained or lost by each party from one election to the next, then dividing by 2.[4]

Table 18.1 shows electoral volatility for lower chamber elections of the post-1978 period for 39 democracies and semi-democracies. We limited the case selection to countries that as of 2003 had experienced at least three consecutive lower chamber elections when the country's Freedom House combined score was 10 or less.[5] Countries with a mean combined score of 11 or more had authoritarian regimes and are classified by Freedom House as 'not free'. Parties have different functions in authoritarian regimes compared to democracies and semi-democracies. Authoritarian regimes do not allow free and fair elections. Their control of elections favors the governing party and tends to limit electoral volatility, so it is usually misleading to compare electoral volatility between the two kinds of regimes. Only the most recent democratic period is counted in countries where there was a democratic breakdown. We use only post-1978 elections.[6]

Table 18.1 includes countries from the 1995–97 wave of World Values Survey (WVS) and the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems.[7] Among the WVS countries that met the Freedom House criterion for at least three consecutive elections, we included all those with a population of at least 10 million. Table 18.1 also includes seven countries (Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Latvia, and Lithuania) that had under 10 million inhabitants so as to analyze some smaller countries, and Bolivia and Ecuador so as to reduce the underrepresentation of poor countries.

Party systems range from very stable (the USA, Australia, etc.) to extremely volatile (Ukraine, Latvia, Romania, Peru, Russia, Poland, and Estonia). Electoral change is on average far greater in the developing democracies and semi-democracies than in the advanced industrial democracies, even if, as Dalton *et al.* (2000) argue, volatility has increased in recent decades in the advanced industrial democracies. In the USA the results of the previous lower chamber election serve as an excellent predictor of subsequent election results by party, erring on average by only 3.2%. In contrast, in Ukraine the identical procedure offers little predictive capacity with an average error of 59.2% (18 times greater than in the USA). Lipset and Rokkan (1967) characterized the Western European party systems as 'frozen'. In contrast, many contemporary party systems in competitive political regimes are highly fluid.

The volatility scores underline the advantage of conceptualizing institutionalization as a continuous variable. Any attempt to establish a dichotomous cut point would be arbitrary. The same observation also applies to the other indicators developed later in this chapter.

Table 18.1   *Electoral volatility, Human Development Index, per capita GDP, and Freedom House scores, 39 countries*

	Mean electoral volatility, lower chamber	Elections included for volatility	Human Development Index (HDI) 2001	Per Capita GDP (PPP US$) 2001	Combined Freedom House scores, 2001–2
United States	3.2	1978–2002	0.937	34,320	2,F
Australia	6.4	1980–2001	0.939	25,370	2,F
Greece	6.9	1981–2000	0.892	17,440	4,F
United Kingdom	8.2	1979–2001	0.930	24,160	3,F
Germany	8.7	1980–2002	0.921	25,350	–
Switzerland	9.4	1979–2003	0.932	28,100	2,F
Belgium	11.5	1978–2003	0.937	25,520	3,F
Denmark	12.2	1979–2001	0.930	29,000	2,F
Sweden	13.5	1979–2002	0.941	24,180	2,F
Norway	14.1	1981–2001	0.944	29,620	2,F
Portugal	14.1	1979–2002	0.896	18,150	2,F
Spain	16.5	1979–2000	0.918	20,150	3,F
Netherlands	16.6	1981–2003	0.938	27,190	2,F
Chile	16.7	1989–2001	0.831	9,190	4,F
France	17.5	1978–2002	0.925	23,990	3,F
Japan	18.6	1979–2000	0.932	25,130	3,F
Taiwan	18.7	1996–2001	–	–	3,F
Italy	22.1	1979–2001	0.916	24,670	3,F
Colombia	22.1	1978–2002	0.779	7,040	8,PF
Mexico	22.7	1988–2000	0.800	8,430	5,F
Brazil	24.1	1986–2002	0.777	7,360	6,PF
South Korea	24.6	1988–2000	0.879	15,090	4,F
Argentina	24.9	1983–2001	0.849	11,320	6,PF
India	25.0	1980–1999	0.590	2,840	5,F
Hungary	25.1	1990–2002	0.837	12,340	3,F
Czech Republic	25.7	1990–2002	0.861	14,720	3,F
Venezuela	31.3	1978–2001	0.775	5,670	8,PF
Ecuador	36.4	1979–1998	0.731	3,280	6,PF
Bulgaria	36.8	1990–2001	0.795	6,890	4,F
Slovenia	38.2	1992–2000	0.881	17,130	3,F
Bolivia	39.8	1980–2002	0.672	2,300	4,F
Estonia	42.4	1992–2003	0.833	10,170	3,F
Poland	46.6	1991–2001	0.841	9,450	3,F
Lithuania	49.2	1992–2000	0.824	8,470	3,F
Russia	50.0	1993–1999	0.779	7,100	10,PF
Peru	51.9	1980–2001	0.752	4,570	4,F
Romania	53.0	1990–2000	0.773	5,830	4,F
Latvia	58.2	1993–2002	0.811	7,730	3,F
Ukraine	59.2	1994–2002	0.766	4,350	8,PF

Sources: HDI and GDP values in 2001 are from United Nations Development Programme, 2003. Freedom House scores found at http://polisci.la.psu.edu/faculty/Casper/FHratings.pdf; F=Free; PF=Partly Free

Table 18.1 also presents the 2001 Human Development Index (HDI) for these 39 countries – as reported in the *Human Development Report* (United Nations Development Programme, 2003) – and their 2003 Freedom House scores. In general, wealthier countries have lower electoral volatility. In an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with countries' mean volatility as the dependent variable and their HDI in 2001 as the only independent variable, the HDI variable was highly significant ($p < 0.0005$) and had a strong substantive impact; every increase of 0.100 in the HDI led to an expected decrease of 12.5% in electoral volatility. The HDI accounted for 46.3% of the variance in volatility scores. In a second OLS

regression with only one independent variable, gross domestic product (GDP) per capita was an even more powerful predictor of volatility, accounting for 60.6% of variance in volatility scores. The per capita GDP variable was highly significant ($p < 0.0005$), and it had a strong substantive impact; a \$1000 increase in per capita GDP produces an expected decrease of 1.29% in electoral volatility. These results show that the advanced industrial democracies have much more stable party systems than the less developed democracies and semi-democracies. The correlation between countries' per capita income and their mean electoral volatility was an impressive –0.78, significant at $p < 0.0005$, two-tailed. The 16 countries with the highest HDIs (HDI ≥ 0.892) are among the 18 countries with the lowest electoral volatility.

The causes of the powerful correlation between a higher level of development and lower electoral volatility require further research beyond what is possible here; we offer only some brief reflections. The fact that most western European party systems stabilized before World War II (Bartolini and Mair, 1990; Lipset and Rokkan, 1967), when those countries had much lower standards of living than they currently enjoy, indicates that the main explanation is not a modernization argument by which a higher level of development causes lower electoral volatility. In most of what are now the advanced industrial democracies, parties were vehicles of social and political integration of masses of new citizens (Chalmers, 1964; Pizzorno, 1981). They pushed for the extension of the franchise and thereby created new citizens. They built encompassing organizations and solidified strong loyalties. In most late democratizing countries, parties were less central in the struggle to expand citizenship, and they never had the far-reaching social functions or fostered the strong identities that they did in the early democratizers (Gunther and Diamond, 2003). These differences in historical patterns (i.e., path dependence) help account for the high correlations between a higher level of development and a more stable party system. Poor economic performance in many less developed countries has also contributed to high electoral volatility (Remmer, 1991; Roberts and Wibbels, 1999). A final contributing factor to high electoral volatility in many less developed countries has been frequent supply-side changes, as political elites shift from one party to another (Rose and Munro, 2003).

Converse (1969) argued that party systems would become more stable over time as voters came to identify with certain parties.[8] Some recent research, however, has indicated that most voters learn fairly quickly to locate parties' positions (Kitschelt et al., 1999), and that party systems in less developed countries do not on average tend to become more stable over time (Bielasiak, 2002). Our data on electoral volatility seem to support this argument. For the 19 countries in Table 18.1 with HDI less than 0.850, for the first electoral period included, electoral volatility averaged 38.2%. In subsequent electoral periods, volatility for these countries averaged 33.1% ($n=19$), 34.8% ($n=16$), 35.0% ($n=10$), and 27.9% ($n=7$). None of the volatility averages after the first electoral period differs statistically ($p < 0.10$, two–tailed) from the 39.6% average for the first period, so there is no statistically significant tendency toward diminishing volatility over time. The data on volatility thus indicate that institutionalization is not linear or teleological. Rose and Munro (2003) refer to this phenomenon of extended time without institutionalization as 'competition without institutionalization'. Weak institutionalization (and high volatility) could go on for an extended period.

During the post-1980 period, most countries have not experienced huge shifts in electoral volatility from one election to the next. The correlation between countries' scores in the first electoral period used in Table 18.1 and the second is 0.68 ($n=39$; $p < 0.0005$); between the second and third periods it is 0.83 ($n=34$; $p < 0.0005$), between the third and fourth periods it is 0.73 ($n=27$; $p < 0.0005$), and between the fourth and fifth periods it is 0.69 ($n=23$; $p < 0.0005$). Even over an extended period, the correlations hold up at moderately strong levels. For example, the correlation between volatility in the first and the fifth periods is 0.54 ($p = 0.008$) and between the second and fifth it is 0.69 ($p < 0.0005$). A few countries exhibit marked declines in volatility over time (e.g., Brazil after 1994), while a few manifest notable increases over time (e.g., Italy after 1993, Venezuela after 1988), but volatility is fairly stable in most countries.

PARTY ROOTS IN SOCIETY: IDEOLOGICAL VOTING

The second dimension of party system institutionalization is party anchoring in society. In more institutionalized party systems, parties develop strong and stable roots in society. Where parties have strong roots in society,

most voters feel connected to a party and regularly vote for its candidates.

Most theories about why individuals develop strong allegiances to parties – or, stated conversely, why parties develop strong roots in society – focus on ideological or programmatic linkages between voters and parties. According to such theories, voters choose a party because it represents their ideological or programmatic preferences. The assumption of strong programmatic or ideological linkages characterizes proximity and directional spatial models of voting, the literature on the left–right schema (Fuchs and Klingemann, 1990), social cleavage approaches to party systems (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967), and some prominent theories on party realignments in the advanced industrial democracies (Inglehart, 1984, 1990; Kitschelt, 1994). We agree that programmatic or ideological linkages are an important means of stabilizing electoral competition (though clientelistic and traditional/affective linkages can have this effect); we disagree that such linkages are strong in most party systems and instead show that there is wide variance in the strength of ideological linkages.

Spatial models of voting are one of the most important approaches to understanding how individuals develop attachments to specific parties and why parties develop deep roots in society. The proximity spatial model of voting is associated with Budge (1994), Cox (1990), Downs (1957), Enelow and Hinich (1984), Hinich and Munger (1994), and Westholm (1997), among others. Hinich and Munger (1994) developed a particularly sophisticated proximity spatial model. They argue that spatial competition does not necessarily occur along a left–right economic dimension,[9] but they still assume that voters choose a party or candidate on the basis of ideology. In this theory, individuals develop attachments to parties because they believe that those parties best advance their interests. Their argument about why large numbers of individuals become attached to parties revolves around the ideological congruence between voters and their preferred parties. Voters choose a candidate or party on the basis of a decision about which one best advances their programmatic interests. Ideology serves as a shortcut for this electoral decision.

Directional spatial models agree that voters choose a candidate or party based on ideological position, but they differ from proximity spatial models in one key respect. In directional theories, citizens vote not according to which party is closest to them on the left–right scale, but rather according to the parties' ideological orientation on a few issues about which the voter has an intense preference (Rabinowitz and MacDonald, 1989; Rabinowitz et al., 1991). The directional approach shares with the proximity models the view that ideological position determines voters' preferences for candidates or parties and is responsible for creating party roots in society.[10]

Other major bodies of literature about parties and voters implicitly assume that voting is programmatic or ideological.[11] Lipset and Rokkan's (1967) social cleavage theory of party systems assumes that voters identify their interests on the basis of their sociological position in society – class, religion, ethnicity or nationality, and urban/rural residence. Implicitly in their argument, some parties programmatically or ideologically advance the interests of different sectors of society, and individuals form their party preference on the basis of the programmatic/ideological interests that result from these sociological positions (see also Bartolini and Mair, 1990; Scully, 1992; Valenzuela, 1997).

Another important scholarly tradition sees the left–right schema, which synthesizes ideological orientations, as a stabilizing psychological anchor that influences the vote. According to this literature, individuals determine their party preferences on the basis of their ideological orientation (Inglehart and Klingemann, 1976; Klingemann, 1979; Inglehart, 1979; Laponce, 1981; Fuchs and Klingemann, 1990; Fleury and Lewis-Beck, 1993; Knutsen, 1997).

In sum, three important scholarly traditions assume that the linkages between voters and parties are programmatic or ideological. In contrast, we show that there is great variance in the extent to which party competition in different countries is programmatic or ideological. Ideological voting as measured by the traditional left–right schema varies enormously.[12]

The final column of Table 18.2 provides a measure of the cross-national variance in ideological voting based on the results of a logistic regression analysis (Columns 2 through 4). In the logistic regressions, party vote as expressed by survey respondents is the dichotomous dependent variable, and respondents' positions on the left-right scale from 1 to 10 are the only independent variable. The analysis is limited to some countries that had a combined Freedom House score of 10 or less in 1996. The analysis includes the three largest parties (according to the number of respondents who expressed a party preference in the survey) in

each country.[13] For a country-level score, we started with the results of two simulations (not shown) based on the estimated logistic regression coefficients (Column 3). The first simulation estimated the predicted probability that voter A would choose party i rather than party j if A located herself at 3.25 on the left-right scale (3.25 is the exact median point between the exact center and the furthest left point). The second simulation estimated the predicted probability that voter A would choose party i rather than j if A located herself at 7.75 on the left–right scale (7.75 is the exact median point between the exact center and the furthest right point, 10.00). The column labeled 'First difference probabilities …' shows how much the likelihood of voting for i rather than j changed with the change in the voter's position from 3.25 to 7.75. If a voter at 3.25 had a 0.25 predicted probability of voting for i and a voter at 7.75 had a 0.65 predicted probability of voting for i rather than j, then the first difference probability would be 0.40. The country level score is the mean for the three scores for the pairs of parties for that country.[14]

The cross-national differences in ideological voting are huge. As expected, the predictability of the vote on the basis of left-right position is higher in countries with lower electoral volatility. The correlation between a country's electoral volatility and the mean of the first difference probabilities in Table 18.2 is −.56 ($n = 32$, significant at $p < .001$). This strong correlation between ideological voting and the stability of interparty competition suggests that the three theoretical approaches discussed earlier were probably right that programmatic/ideological linkages are the main way to build an institutionalized party system. Nevertheless, in a few cases (the USA and Australia, for example), electoral stability is very high despite moderate ideological structuring of the vote, whereas a few post-communist cases (the Czech Republic and Bulgaria) exhibit moderate to high electoral volatility despite high ideological structuring. The huge variance in ideological voting strongly supports our argument that social scientists cannot assume that party competition is programmatic or ideological. This assumption is misleading in most fluid party systems.

We expected that where programmatic/ideological anchoring of parties in society is weaker, party supporters would have more scattered distributions along the left–right scale because strong programmatic/ideological linkages to parties rest on programmatic/ideological consistency among parties' loyal voters. To test this hypothesis, Table 18.3 provides a measure of the extent to which a country's parties were cohesive along the left–right dimension. We constructed the country score by beginning with the standard deviation of each party's supporters along the left–right dimension, then weighted the parties by their number of supporters.[15] The correlation between a country's ideological anchoring in Table 18.2 and its weighted standard deviation in Table 18.3 is −.50, significant at $p < .01$ ($n = 30$). This correlation supports the hypothesis that ideological/programmatic consistency within parties facilitates ideological structuring of party competition.

Although programmatic or ideological linkages between voters and parties are not the only ways to create party system stability, they are an important means by which voters become attached to parties and hence an important means by which parties become rooted in society. Where ideological linkages to parties are strong, electoral volatility tends to be lower, precisely as Lipset and Rokkan (1967) and spatial theorists postulate.[16] Where there is a weak linkage between voters' ideological and programmatic position and their preferred party, voters are more likely to drift from one party to the next – that is, they are more likely to be floating voters.

This evidence suggests a need to rethink theories about voters, voting, and party competition in less institutionalized party systems. The programmatic and ideological linkages between voters and parties are weaker in these systems than most of the theoretical literature assumes. Spatial models and other theoretical approaches that assume ideological voting are not wrong, but there is considerable variance in how accurately they portray party competition in different countries – a fact that spatial models have not acknowledged. Ideological voting is a powerful aspect of party competition in most of the advanced industrial democracies; it is much weaker in most post-1978 competitive regimes. By implication, some of the theoretical tools and assumptions that have been central in understanding party competition in the advanced industrial democracies are less useful, indeed sometimes problematic, in analyzing less institutionalized party systems. For example, the assumption that most voters' electoral decision is programmatic or ideological is unwarranted and misleading in many post-1978 competitive regimes.

The modest correlation between ideological structuring of party competition and electoral stability suggests one other key point. All three theories discussed in this section overlook or

Table 18.2   *Ideological voting in 33 countries*
Dependent variable for columns 2 to 5: respondents' expressed party vote
Independent variable: respondents' left-right position on a 1 to 10 scale

Country	Pair of parties (Dependent variable)	Significance of left-right logistic coefficient	Nagelkerke R^2	First Difference Probabilities between values 3.25 and 7.75 of left-right position on a 1 to 10 scale	Mean of First Difference Probabilities
Italy	Forza Italia v. PDS	0.000	0.85	.93	.72
	Forza Italia v. AN	0.000	0.13	.25	
	PDS v. AN	0.000	0.91	.98	
Sweden	Moderata Samligspartiet v. Social Democrats	0.000	0.82	.93	.69
	Moderata Samligspartiet v. Vansterpartiet	0.000	0.94	.91	
	Social Democrats v. Vansterpartiet	0.000	0.23	.24	
Portugal	PSD v. PS	0.000	0.50	.88	.64
	PSD v. CDU	0.000	0.82	.80	
	CDU v. PS	0.000	0.47	.25	
Czech Rep.	ODS v. CSSD	0.000	0.62	.82	.62
	ODS v. KCSM	0.000	0.89	.82	
	CSSD v. KCSM	0.000	0.52	.22	
Netherlands	PvdA v. CDA	0.000	0.47	.75	.60
	PvdA v. D'66	0.000	0.11	.40	
	CDA v. D'66	0.000	0.28	.65	
Chile	Socialists (PS+PPD) v. PDC	0.000	0.12	.40	.56
	Conservatives (UDI+RN) v. PDC	0.000	0.33	.54	
	Conservatives (UDI+RN) v. Socialists (PS+PPD)	0.000	0.53	.73	
Uruguay	Colorado v. Nacional	0.066	0.01	.13	.56
	Colorado v. Frente Amplio	0.000	0.62	.77	
	Nacional v. Frente Amplio	0.000	0.58	.79	
Spain	PP v. PSOE	0.000	0.63	.80	.55
	PP v. Izquierda Unida	0.000	0.62	.85	
	PSOE v. IU	Not significant	0.00	–	
France	Socialist v. RPR	0.000	0.76	.92	.54
	Socialist v. National Front	0.000	0.59	.71	
	RPR v. National Front	Not significant	0.01	–	
Poland	Solidarność v. PSL	0.000	0.18	.39	.52
	Solidarność v. SLD	0.000	0.53	.66	
	PSL v. SLD	0.000	0.24	.50	
UK	Conservative v. Labour	0.000	0.43	.73	.52
	Conservative v. Liberal Democrats	0.000	0.21	.52	
	Labour v. Liberal Democrats	0.000	0.07	.32	

Table 18.2 *(Continued)*

Country	Pair of parties (Dependent variable)	Significance of left-right logistic coefficient	Nagelkerke R^2	*First Difference Probabilities* between values 3.25 and 7.75 of left-right position on a 1 to 10 scale	Mean of First Difference Probabilities
West Germany	SPD v. CDU/CSU	0.000	0.35	.71	.51
	SPD v. Greens	0.010	0.03	.13	
	CDU/CSU v. Greens	0.000	0.47	.69	
Denmark	Socialdemokr. v. Konservative	0.000	0.52	.77	.50
	Socialdemokr v. Venstre	0.000	0.52	.74	
	Konservative v. Venstre	Not significant	0.00	–	
Greece	PASOK v. Nea Demokratia	0.000	0.70	.82	.50
	PASOK v. Politiki Anixi	0.000	0.18	.28	
	Nea Demokratia v. Pol.Anixi	0.000	0.17	.40	
Switzerland	Radical Démocratique v. Socialist	0.000	0.40	.70	.48
	Radical Démocratique v. Christian Democrats	Not significant	0.01	–	
	Socialist v. Christian Democrats	0.055	0.46	.73	
Bulgaria	Union of Democratic Forces v. Socialist Party	0.000	0.63	.67	.45
	Union of Democratic Forces v. Agrarian Party	0.000	0.28	.47	
	Socialist Party v. Agrarian Party	0.000	0.22	.20	
Norway	Labour v. Progressive	0.000	0.10	.28	.43
	Labour v. Conservative	0.000	0.38	.59	
	Progressive v. Conservative	0.000	0.10	.42	
US	Republicans v. Democrats	0.000	0.15	.42	.42
Japan	Liberal Democratic Party v. New Frontier party	0.000	0.11	.25	.38
	Liberal Democratic Party v. Socialist Party	0.000	0.30	.53	
	New Frontier party v. Socialist Party	0.009	0.08	.35	
Belgium	CD&V v. PS	0.000	0.49	.34	.36
	CD&V v. VLD	Not significant	0.01	–	
	PS v. VLD	0.000	0.48	.73	
Slovenia	Liberal Democracy v. People's Party	0.002	0.06	.31	.36
	Liberal Democracy v. Christian Democrats	0.000	0.20	.55	
	People's Party v. Christian Democrats	0.032	0.04	.21	

(Continued)

Table 18.2   *(Continued)*

Country	Pair of parties (Dependent variable)	Significance of left-right logistic coefficient	Nagelkerke R²	*First Difference Probabilities* between values 3.25 and 7.75 of left-right position on a 1 to 10 scale	Mean of First Difference Probabilities
Hungary	MSZP v. FIDESZ	0.000	0.32	.57	.31
	MSZP v. FKGP	0.010	0.04	.12	
	FIDESZ v. FKGP	0.000	0.14	.23	
Australia	Australian Labor v. Liberal Party	0.000	0.16	.45	.30
	Australian Labor v. Green Party	0.006	0.01	.05	
	Liberal Party v. Green Party	0.000	0.17	.39	
Argentina	PJ v. UCR	0.000	0.05	.22	.26
	PJ v. Frepaso	0.000	0.13	.37	
	UCR v. Frepaso	0.034	0.03	.18	
Taiwan	Nationalist Party v. Democratic Progressive Party	0.000	0.13	.41	.25
	Nationalist Party v. New Party	0.005	0.02	.13	
	Democratic Progressive Party v. New Party	0.002	0.05	.22	
Mexico	PRI v. PRD	0.000	0.13	.28	.20
	PAN v. PRD	0.000	0.04	.18	
	PRI v. PAN	0.000	0.03	.13	
Venezuela	AD v. COPEI	Not significant	0.00	–	.19
	AD v. Causa R	0.000	0.22	.28	
	COPEI v. Causa R	0.000	0.21	.29	
Brazil	PMDB v. PT	0.000	0.08	.22	.18
	PMDB v. PSDB	0.064	0.02	.12	
	PT v. PSDB	0.000	0.15	.19	
Ukraine	Democratic Party Ukr. v. Communist Party Ukr.	Not significant	0.02	–	.15
	Democratic Party Ukr. v. Popular Movement Ukr.	0.000	0.13	.30	
	Communist Party Ukr. v. Popular Movement Ukr.	0.007	0.04	.16	
Russia	Communist Party v. Our Home Russia	0.000	0.10	.28	.12
	Communist Party v. Lib-Dem. Party	0.040	0.03	.08	
	Our Home Russia v. Lib-Dem. Party	Not significant	0.01	–	
Peru	Cambio 90 v. UPP	Not significant	0.00	–	.06
	Cambio 90 v. APRA	Not significant	0.00	–	
	UPP v. APRA	0.015	0.03	.18	
Romania	CDR v. PDSR	0.001	0.03	.18	.06
	CDR v. PD	Not significant	0.01	–	
	PDSR v. PD	Not significant	0.01	–	

(Continued)

Table 18.2   *(Continued)*

Country	Pair of parties (Dependent variable)	Significance of left–right logistic coefficient	Nagelkerke R^2	*First Difference Probabilities between values 3.25 and 7.75 of left-right position on a 1 to 10 scale*	Mean of First Difference Probabilities
India	Indian National Congress v. BJP	0.023	0.02	.08	.05
	Indian National Congress v. Janata Dal (People's Party)	Not significant	0.01	–	
	BJP v. Janata Dal (People's Party)	0.024	0.02	.08	

Column 6 is the mean of the 3 scores in Column 5, counting coefficients not significant at p<.10 (Column 3) as equal to 0 in Column 5.

Sources: *European Election Study 1994* (Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, UK, West Germany), *Comparative Study of Electoral Systems 1996–2000* (Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania), *World Values Survey 1997*, (all the remaining countries).

Table 18.3   *Standard deviations of party supporters' left–right positions*

Country	Country score*	Country	Country score*
Sweden	1.35	Ukraine	1.77
West Germany	1.46	Japan	1.83
Spain	1.46	USA	1.83
Portugal	1.48	Argentina	1.85
Italy	1.49	Russia	1.86
Netherlands	1.49	Bulgaria	1.87
France (94)	1.50	Uruguay	1.88
Norway	1.51	Hungary	1.90
Denmark	1.55	Belgium	1.93
Greece	1.56	Poland	1.98
UK (excl. Northern Ireland)	1.64	Peru	2.10
Slovenia	1.65	Mexico	2.45
Switzerland	1.65	India	2.52
Czech Republic	1.67	Romania	2.59
Taiwan	1.67	Brazil	2.84
Australia	1.68	Venezuela	3.00
Chile	1.68		

Note: The weighted country mean is the mean standard deviation for all parties with at least two party supporters, weighted by the number of party supporters. The weighting means that all individuals who expressed a party preference are weighted equally, provided that their party had at least one other supporter among survey respondents. The reason for excluding parties with only one supporter is that the standard deviation must be zero if $N=1$.

Sources: as Table 18.2

understate three non-programmatic and non-ideological linkages that might orient voters (Kitschelt, 2000), though only two of the three could create stable bonds between voters and parties and thereby foster strong party roots in society. These non-programmatic rationales deserve close attention in less institutionalized party systems. First, voters might choose more on the basis of clientelistic goods than ideological position. In this case, a voter might cast a

ballot for a politician or party even though a competitor is ideologically closer to her preferred position. By securing clientelistic goods, voters can advance their material interests in a way that would not be possible through public goods.[17] Second, all three theories overlook that voting might be personalistic, without a strong link to ideological preferences or to sociological location (Silveira, 1998). A voter may cast her ballot not on the basis of an ideological preference but rather because of sympathy for the personality traits of a candidate. Under these conditions, the ideological bond between individuals and parties is weak, and there may be no other bond that creates an enduring allegiance to a given party. Third, voters might become attached to parties on the basis of traditional/affective ties, somewhat independent of clientelism and programmatic predilections. In contemporary competitive regimes in which television has a strong impact in politics, however, traditional/affective linkages are almost certain to erode.

PARTY ROOTS IN SOCIETY AND PERSONALISTIC VOTING

In this section, we examine a different aspect of party roots in society. Widespread voting based on the personality characteristics of candidates, devoid of programmatic or ideological content, is a telling sign of weak party roots in society. With strong bonds between voters and parties, whether constructed through programmatic/ideological, clientelistic, or traditional/affective linkages, voters remain faithful to their party, and candidates' personalities are of secondary importance.

Leaders and personalization have become increasingly important in elections outcomes, even in countries with parliamentary systems of government. This phenomenon has been called the 'presidentialization of modern election campaigns' (Crewe and King, 1994; Kaase, 1994). In the advanced industrial democracies, citizen evaluations of leaders contain programmatic, ideological, or party identification components. In fluid party systems, personalism devoid of programmatic and ideological components usually plays a much greater role in voting (Silveira, 1998).[18] In more institutionalized systems, voters are more likely to identify with a party, and parties dominate patterns of political recruitment and deliberation. In fluid systems, many voters choose according to personality more than party; anti-party politicians

are more able to win office. Populism and anti-politics are more common. Personalities more than party organizations dominate the political scene.

Personalistic voting is an important and partly measurable political phenomenon (King, 2002a, 2002b), yet it has been neglected in most of the theoretical literature on voting, including spatial models and works based on the left–right scheme. In fluid systems, individual personalities, independent of party and programmatic preferences, have a sizable impact in electoral campaigns. Many citizens vote to a significant degree on the basis of the personal characteristics of candidates. Personalistic voting is common, and political independents can successfully seek high-level office. Space for populists is greater, especially in presidential systems since candidates appeal directly to voters without needing to be elected head of a party in order to become head of state. Candidates can capture high executive office such as the presidency and governorships without being rooted in an established party.

One way to assess the importance of personalism in electoral campaigns is data on outsider presidential candidates. Electorally competitive independent presidential candidates and candidates from new parties reflect a high degree of personalism and voters' openness to candidates from outside the established parties. For operational purposes, we define outsider presidential candidates as independents (with no party affiliation) or candidates from a party that won less than 5% of the lower chamber vote in the previous election and did not have presidential candidates in any election prior to the previous one.

Table 18.4 presents data on the share of the vote won by outsider presidential candidates in six Latin American countries and (for comparative purposes) the USA.[19] Outsiders won the presidential election in Peru in 1990, Venezuela in 1993 and 1998, and Colombia and Ecuador in 2002.[20] This extraordinary political occurrence manifests weak institutionalization of the existing party system. Another outsider (Evo Morales) made it to the runoff round in the presidential election in Bolivia in 2002. In Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia, outsiders won at least 50% of the valid vote in one of the last two (as of 2005) presidential elections.

Brazilian President Fernando Collor de Mello (1990–92) created a party in order to run for president in 1989, and he defeated the candidates of the established parties. Seven months after his inauguration, his party won

Table 18.4   *Average share of vote won by outsider presidential candidates in five most recent presidential elections, select countries*

Country	Elections included	% of vote won by outsider candidates, most recent election	Average % of vote won by outsider candidates, last five elections
United States	1984–2000	0.3	6.0
Brazil[a]	1989–2002	0.0	13.4
Ecuador	1988–2002	58.9	17.5
Bolivia	1985–2002	51.3	22.1
Venezuela	1983–2000	40.2	26.5
Colombia	1986–2002	66.5	28.5
Peru	1985–2001	27.9	32.7

[a] Data for Brazil include four elections only because there have been only four popular presidential elections since the transition to democracy in 1985.

only 40 of 503 lower chamber seats in the October 1990 congressional elections. Clearly, his appeal was personalistic and not party-based. His party disappeared in the months following his 1992 resignation from office in order to avoid his impeachment. Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori (1990–2000) also created a party in order to run for the presidency; he, too, campaigned against parties and subsequently eschewed efforts to build a party. In Peru, political independents dominated the 1995 municipal elections. Having seen from Fujimori that anti-party appeals could win popular support, a new cohort of anti-party politicians emerged. Fujimori used focus groups and surveys to determine who ran on the ballot of his highly personalized party. Fujimori himself, rather than the party, controlled congressional nominations (Conaghan, 2000). This personalistic control of candidate selection is the antithesis of what is found in an institutionalized system. Moreover, as remains true in Russia, candidates could gain ballot access without a party and could win election as independents. Former coup leader Hugo Chávez created a new party in his successful bid for the presidency of Venezuela in 1998. In a similar vein, in Ecuador in 2002, former coup leader Lucio Gutiérrez created a new party in his successful campaign for president.

Personalism and anti-party politicians are also common in some post-communist cases. Former Russian President Boris Yeltsin was not a member of a party and undermined parties. Alexander Lebed, who finished third in the 1996 Russian presidential election, ran as an independent. Non-partisan candidates have fared well in the plurality races for both chambers of the Russian parliament. In the 1993 elections, well over half of the single-member district candidates for the lower chamber were independents without partisan affiliation, and only 83 of the 218 deputies elected belonged to a party (Moser, 1995: 98). In 1995, more than 1000 of the 2700 candidates for the single-member district seats were independents. Independents won 78 of the 225 single-member seats; the largest single party could muster only 58 seats (White *et al.*, 1997: 203, 224). Former King Simeon II of Bulgaria also created an electorally successful personalistic political vehicle.

Why is personalistic voting widespread in some party systems even after considerable time under democratic rule? We cannot fully address this question here, but some brief speculations are in order. First, historical sequences in party building are important. In the old, well-established democracies, parties became deeply rooted in society before the emergence of the modern mass media, especially television. In Western Europe, working-class parties integrated workers into the political system and provided fundamental sources of identity (Chalmers, 1964; Pizzorno, 1981). A similar phenomenon occurred with Christian Democratic parties (Kalyvas, 1996). In contrast, in most weakly institutionalized systems, television became a mass phenomenon before parties were deeply entrenched in society. Candidates for executive office can get their messages across on television without the need to rely on well-developed party organizations (Sartori, 1989), allowing the emergence of highly personalistic parties (Gunther and Diamond, 2003: 187). Second, the poor regime performance of many post-1978 competitive regimes has discredited governing parties (Remmer, 1991; Roberts and Wibbels, 1999; Tavits, 2005) and, even more broadly, has

discredited parties as vehicles of representation. The discrediting of parties has opened the doors to personalistic anti-party crusaders. Third, in many post-1978 competitive regimes, parties are programmatically diffuse (Kitschelt *et al.*, 1999: 164–90; Ostiguy, 1998), making it difficult for voters to determine which party is closest to their own positions, or they may be ideologically unreliable, undertaking radical shifts in positions (Stokes, 2001). In such circumstances, voters are volatile and more likely to flock to personalistic candidates, who often campaign against parties. Fourth, personalistic voting is likely to be stronger in presidential systems than in parliamentary systems and most of the advanced industrial democracies have parliamentary systems, and many post-1978 competitive regimes have presidential systems.

The prevalence of personalism is related to the second and fourth dimensions of party system institutionalization. Personalistic linkages between voters and candidates tend to be stronger where party roots in society are weaker. They also tend to be stronger with weak party organizations and weakly institutionalized parties. In weakly institutionalized party systems, parties have precarious resources and are weakly professionalized. Many parties are personalistic vehicles (Conaghan, 2000).

Voting based on the rational evaluation of leaders could in principle be a sign of political sophistication and greater electoral accountability. King (2002a) calls such reasoned evaluations, which have programmatic/ideological content, the indirect effects of candidate evaluations. In many fluid party systems, however, the relationship between individuals' ideological position and their evaluation of political leaders is weak. Their evaluation of leaders is not based on programmatic and ideological principles.

Table 18.5 shows the product moment correlation of individuals' evaluation of political leaders and their position on the left–right scale. The relationship between leadership evaluation and ideology is high for the advanced industrial democracies, but lower in countries with weakly institutionalized party systems. In a few countries (Mexico, Peru, and Taiwan), the relationship between citizen evaluation of leaders and their left–right position was almost zero. The correlation between countries' mean Pearson correlation in Table 18.5 and their electoral volatility (Table 18.1) is 0.41 ($p < 0.10$, $n = 19$), demonstrating a somewhat stronger linkage between ideological position and leadership evaluation in institutionalized party systems.

Leadership evaluation might in principle be a reasonable means to promote representation and electoral accountability, but where leadership evaluation is not well connected to ideological or programmatic issues, it indicates non-programmatic personalism. According to many views (Barnes, 1977; Converse and Pierce, 1986), representation devoid of programmatic content is meaningless; representation exists only because of a programmatic/ideological match between the views of representatives and citizens (see also Luna and Zechmeister, 2005). Such representation occurs only by accident if at all when there is no relationship between citizens' ideological positions and their assessment of political leaders. In many post-1978 competitive regimes, the connection between citizens' ideological position and their preferred political leaders is weak.

The importance of personalistic voting devoid of much ideological content in less institutionalized party systems suggests again the need for caution in applying theoretical models predicated on the assumption that voters' electoral choice is programmatic or ideological. This is often not the case in fluid party systems.

CONCLUSION

Awareness of the importance of party system institutionalization has grown in the past decade, but social scientists who work on fluid party systems need to continue rethinking the way we theorize about and compare party systems. Some theories that have been presented as universalistic, for example, spatial theories of voting and party competition, in fact are more useful for analyzing the advanced industrial democracies than fluid party systems. It is essential to be aware of these differences between fluid and more institutionalized systems and to avoid assuming that purportedly universalistic theories constructed implicitly on the basis of the advanced industrial democracies will equally apply to fluid party systems. Analyzing less institutionalized party systems sheds light on important issues that do not surface in examining the advanced industrial democracies.[21]

Party systems vary markedly in levels of institutionalization, and institutionalization varies independently of the number of parties and the level of polarization. Whereas analysts

Table 18.5   *Ideological anchoring of leaders' evaluation in 19 countries included in the CSES study (Pearson correlation coefficients)*

Czech	Vaclav Klaus	0.60**
Republic	Milos Zeman	−0.42**
(1996)	M. Grebenicek	−0.63**
Average		0.54
Sweden	Goran Persson	−0.39**
(1998)	Carl Bildt	0.58**
	Gudrun Schyman	−0.48**
Average		0.48
Spain	Jose Maria Aznar	0.57**
	Joaquin Almunia	−0.32**
	F. Frutos	−0.29
Average		0.39
Australia	Paul Keating	−0.33**
	John Howard	0.43**
	Tim Fischer	0.39**
Average		0.38
Denmark	P. Nyrup Rasmussen	−0.36**
(1998)	U. Ellemann-Jensen	0.52**
	P. Stig Møller	0.26**
Average		0.38
Portugal	J. Barroso	0.55**
(1997)	A. Guterres	−0.24**
	P. Portas	0.35**
Average		0.38
Hungary	Gyula Horn	−0.39**
(1998)	Viktor Orban	0.34**
	Jozsef Torgyan	0.36**
Average		0.36
Norway	Thorbjorn Jagland	−0.17**
(1997)	Carl Ivar Hagen	0.45**
	Jan Petersen	0.40**
Average		0.34
Switzerland	Christoph Blocher	0.50**
(1999)	Ruth Dreifuss	−0.34**
	Franz Steinegger	0.18**
Average		0.34
United Kingdom	Tony Blair	−0.30**
(1997)	John Major	0.40**
	Paddy Ashdown	−0.16**
Average		0.29
United States	Bill Clinton	−0.27**
	Bob Dole	0.31**
Average		0.29
Russia	Zyuganov	−0.51**
(1999)	Kiriyenko	0.18**
	Luzhkov	−0.12**
Average		0.27

Table 18.5   (Continued)

Germany	Schroeder	−0.21**
(1998)	Kohl	0.26**
	Waigel	0.28**
Average		0.25
Netherlands	Wim Kok	−0.10**
(1998)	Frits Bolkesetein	0.34**
	J. De Hoop	0.21**
Average		0.22
Slovenia	Janez Drnovsek	−0.19**
	Marjan Podobnik	0.12**
	Janez Jansa	0.36**
Average		0.22
Romania	Emil Constantinescu	0.19**
	Ion Iliescu	−0.17**
Average		0.18
Taiwan	Lee Tung-Hui	0.10*
	Peng Ming Min	−0.02
	Lin Yang-Gang	0.19**
Average		0.10
Mexico	E. Zedillo	0.12**
(2000)	D. Fernández de Cevallos	0.11**
	Cardenas Solorzano	−0.05
Average		0.08
Peru	A. Toledo	−0.05
	A. García	0.03
	L. Flores	0.13**
Average		0.04

Entries are Pearson correlation scores between respondents' left–right ideological self-placement and their evaluation of specified leaders. The country average is an unweighted average of the absolute values of the three individual correlations for the country. Non-significant correlations do not differ statistically from 0 at the 90% confidence level, and hence we treated them as a correlation of 0 in calculating the country average.

*Significant at 0.10 level.

**Significant at 0.05 level.

who compare party systems on the basis of the number of parties would lump together multiparty cases regardless of the level of institutionalization, the weakly institutionalized cases differ markedly from solidly entrenched ones. Treating all multiparty systems as an undifferentiated category when there are vast differences in institutionalization is misleading. Ecuador, Norway, Peru, Russia, and Sweden have multiparty systems, but the systems in Norway and Sweden are much more institutionalized than those in Ecuador, Peru, and Russia. Lumping together these cases of multipartyism conceals profound differences in the nature of the systems.

Institutionalization also varies significantly relative to ideological distance in the party system. Some polarized systems (e.g., France from the 1960s to the 1980s, Italy from the 1940s to the 1980s) were well institutionalized. Other polarized systems (e.g., Brazil in the mid- to late 1980s, Venezuela since 1998) are less institutionalized and function in a different manner. A key issue in the comparative study of party systems, as much as the number of parties and the ideological distance among them, is their level of institutionalization.

Our focus in this chapter has been on the crucial differences in party system institutionalization and ways in which these differences dictate a need to rethink party system theory. Spatial constraints prohibit an extended discussion of the consequences of weak party system institutionalization. Mainwaring and Scully (1995),

Mainwaring (1999: 323–36), Moser (1999, 2001), Payne *et al.* (2002), and Stoner Weiss (2001) have written about some such consequences. Our intuition is that institutionalization has important consequences for democratic politics. Otherwise, it would not be a paramount issue in studying party systems. We therefore close with two observations about consequences of weak system institutionalization.

First, weak institutionalization introduces more uncertainty regarding electoral outcomes and can weaken democratic regimes. The turnover from one party to others is higher, the entry barriers to new parties are lower, and the likelihood that a personalistic anti-system politician can become the head of government is much higher. Such uncertainty proved inimical to democracy until the 1980s, when the end of the Cold War reduced the stakes of political conflict and facilitated the post-1989 expansion of democracy and semi-democracy in the world. Even in the post-Cold War context, the much higher level of personalism in weakly institutionalized party systems can pave the way toward authoritarianism – e.g., President Alberto Fujimori in Peru in 1992 or toward the erosion of democratic or semi-democratic regimes – e.g., President Hugo Chávez in Venezuela since 1998 (Mayorga, forthcoming; Tanaka, forthcoming).

Second, weak institutionalization is inimical to electoral accountability. In most democracies, parties are the primary mechanism of electoral accountability. For electoral accountability to work well, voters must be able to identify – in broad terms – what the main parties are and what they stand for (Hinich and Munger, 1994). In contexts where parties frequently appear and disappear, where the competition among them is ideologically and programmatically diffuse, and where personalities often overshadow parties as routes to executive power, the prospects for effective electoral accountability suffer.[22]

For electoral accountability and political representation to function well, the political environment must provide citizens with effective information cues that enable them to vote in reasoned ways without spending an inordinate time reaching these reasoned decisions. In institutionalized systems, parties provide an ideological reference that gives some anchoring to voters. Voters can reduce information costs using the shortcuts at their disposal, thus increasing the levels of electoral accountability. The limited stability of less institutionalized party systems and the weak programmatic/ideological

content that party labels provide in these contexts reduce the information cues that these systems offer voters. The weaker information cues hamper the bounded rationality of voters, undercutting the potential for electoral accountability based on a rational evaluation of policies, governments, and leaders. Where electoral accountability suffers, the promise that representative democracy holds, that elected politicians will serve as agents of the voters to advance some common good or to advance interests of specific constituencies, may break down (Luna and Zechmeister, 2005).

In one of the most famous quotes in the history of the analysis of political parties, Schattschneider (1942: 1) wrote that 'Political parties created modern democracy and modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of the parties'. If the history of modern democracy is built on political parties, then we can expect democracy to have some deficiencies where parties are less stable mechanisms of representation, accountability, and structuring than they have been in the advanced industrial democracies.

NOTES

1. We follow the definitions of democracy and semi-democracy in Mainwaring *et al.* (2001). Competitive political regimes include both democracies and semi-democracies.

2. Our focus is on party *systems*. Other scholars have looked at the institutionalization of *parties* (Dix, 1992; Gunther and Hopkin, 2002; Huntington, 1968: 12–28; Janda, 1980; Levitsky, 2003; Mény, 1990; Panebianco, 1988; Randall and Svåsand, 2002). Party institutionalization in democracies is positively and strongly correlated to party system institutionalization, but the relationship is not linear, as Mainwaring and Scully (1995: 20–1), Randall and Svåsand (2002), Stockton (2001), and Wallis (2003) have noted.